1. Introduction Problems in economic theory are traditionally analysed in terms of stable outcomes (equilibria) or efficient solutions (optima). In the former case, the problem is considered in the context of the interaction of rational, self-interested, autonomous agents; in the latter, the agents are assumed to follow the instructions of the central planner who aims to optimise some global objective. However, in realistic economic systems autonomous agents are often placed together with those controlled by the central planner; indeed, public and private sectors often interact in jointly tackling social problems or locating economic activities. Typically, the autonomous agents will act to obtain their own individual goals, and the problem of the central planner is to coordinate the controlled agents so as to optimise the overall performance of the system, while taking into account the behaviour of self-motivated participants. The present paper is offered with the motivation to investigate such "semi-autonomous" scenarios; Section 2 outlines multiple real-life situations which fit into this framework.
Specifically, we look at assignment problems where agents must be matched with indivisible tasks (or goods). Some players are autonomous, and face private incentives to solve certain tasks; instead of submitting to the planner's will, these agents strive to obtain the task that rates most highly according to their own preference rankings. For technical simplicity we assume that the central planner (CP), who aims to maximise the value of the overall assignment (including the contributions of the autonomous agents), assigns the controlled agents first. That is, the autonomous agents can only choose tasks which are left vacant by the CP. Further in this section we explain why this is indeed a weak assumption.
The contribution of this paper is both conceptual and technical. On the conceptual level we introduce a model to handle selfish behaviour in optimisation settings-specifically, in assignment scenarios. We call this variation of the assignment problem the Semi-Autonomous Assignment Problem (SAAP). When all agents are fully controlled by the CP, the SAAP turns into a classical assignment problem. 1 In the classical assignment problem, an "assignment matrix" specifies the value obtained from each possible task-agent pair. The highest-valued assignment can for example be found with the Hungarian Method of [15] .
The autonomous agents, amended to the classical assignment problem, are assumed to have ordinal preferences over the available tasks. This considerably increases the robustness and applicability of our model. We neither require the central planner to form a belief about cardinal utility functions of the autonomous agents, nor do we assume the autonomous agents to be von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximisers.
2 Likewise, adopting ordinal preferences allows us to directly utilise results from a branch of game theory, usually called matching theory, which originated with the seminal paper of [8] .
3 From the start, matching theory evolved without drawing on the theory of expected utility.
Our first technical contribution is by showing that the optimal solution of an SAAP from the point of view of the central planner corresponds to a stable matching [8] in a particular marriage market 4 formed by autonomous agents and tasks. In this market, the preferences of the autonomous agents are their rankings over tasks, while the values of the "assignment matrix" determine the preferences of the tasks. By assigning the controlled agents, the central planner can block some tasks and in this way essentially determine the market in which the stable matching is formed. Now, the seemingly strong assumption that the central planner moves first does not affect the generality of our model. Making use of a result from matching literature, on page 10 we argue that the order in which the autonomous agents and the central planner make their moves does not affect the final assignment. This is true as long as it is at the disposal of the central planner to replace autonomous agents who occupy tasks by controlled agents, an assumption not too unrealistic for those applications we describe in Section 2.
Formally, the optimisation problem faced by the central planner is a mixed integer bilevel optimisation problem-a hierarchical program where the set of constraints contains a parametric optimisation problem. Solving bilevel programs is difficult in general, and known algorithms would deal with only extremely small problem instances. Our second technical contribution is by taking an alternative approach and reducing the SAAP problem to a disjoint bilinear program, which is much more manageable computationally as it only involves a single minimisation problem instead of a minimax problem.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 motivates our work by describing several real-life situations which resemble SAAPs. The model is then formally defined in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our main technical result-the reduction of the mixed integer bilevel optimisation problem formulation of SAAP to a disjoint bilinear program. We conclude in Section 5 with directions for future work.
2. Real-world examples Semi-autonomous assignment problems arise naturally in the context of location of economic activities. In [14] , for example, the authors discuss the assignment problem in the context of choosing locations for industrial plants under the standard assumption that the central planner is responsible for choosing the location for all of the plants. However, in reality such tasks are typically divided between the public and the private sectors, where private businesses strive to maximise their own profits and the government is concerned with the overall welfare of the society. Note also that state institutions often have the priority over private entrepreneurs in making their choices, consistent with the assumptions of our model.
As another example, consider private-public partnerships (PPP), where the public party, which usually supervises the complete project, intends to advance some public goal. In contrast, the participating private parties are primarily interested in those subprojects which have commercial potential. This poses an obstacle for assigning tasks in a globally optimal way. Companies will try to avoid those tasks which are unprofitable and difficult, trying instead to obtain subprojects promising high profits at low risk. A typical example is the provision of health care through hospitals and doctors, which is facilitated through private-public partnerships in many countries. 5 The payment agreements between the government and the private partners usually do not reimburse a hospital or doctor for exactly those costs associated with a specific patient. As a result, patients (= "tasks") yield different profit opportunities. Although hospitals/doctors (= "agents") participating in a PPP are not formally entitled to pick the profitable patients and reject the others, there may be informal ways to deter unprofitable patients. 6 The model presented in this paper could thereby prescribe an optimal policy for a public health system which both directly employs medical resources (doctors, hospitals etc.) and engages private contractors.
In the Internet economy, the so-called crowdsourcing systems (see, e.g., [3, 5, 11] ) can also be modelled with SAAPs. In a crowdsourcing system, tasks which cannot satisfactorily be solved without human expertise are assigned to a group of more or less anonymous amateur problem solvers (the "crowd"). Yet companies making use of crowdsourcing do not have to totally rely on the crowd. For some of the tasks or even for all of them, they can engage professional problem solvers. These belong to their own personnel or a contractor's personnel who cannot reject tasks assigned to them. In contrast, crowd members can freely choose which tasks to work on, and they are probably not indifferent between all tasks. Hence, the firm has to find an optimal way of distributing its tasks between professional and amateur problem solvers.
Disaster response situations providing prominent examples of crowdsourcing can also be analysed with our model. Consider a disaster relief situation where professional disaster responders coordinated by the government are assisted by local residents and disaster survivors. The government has neither the communication capabilities nor the authority to tell local participants what to do. However, local participants are very helpful and their efforts should not be ignored. Assuming the government can estimate the preferences of local participants (e.g., they visit sites in order of distance from their home), our work provides a way for the government to assign professional disaster responders optimally.
Finally, autonomous task choice can even be observed in military organisations, which are famous for their strict adherence to the principle of obeying orders.
7 If solving critical tasks is "prestigious" in some sense, there may be an incentive for players to unilaterally go for those critical tasks, disregarding the assignment the central planner would prefer. In military history it regularly occurred that ambitious commanders tried to gain fame by acting more bravely or by taking greater risks than desired by the central command. An outstanding example is the celebrated Danish naval officer Peter Jansen Wessel (1691-1720), called Tordenskjold (Danish for "thunder shield"). He constantly strived for the most prestigious tasks in the Great Northern War (1700-1721), thereby notoriously disobeying orders.
8 His confrontation with the Swedish fleet in the Battle of Dynekilen (1716) in which his 7 ships captured 31 Swedish ships and destroyed another 13, was not backed by orders of the admiralty. 9 Wessel's anarchistic conduct evoked considerable criticism in the Danish admiralty, eventually leading to a trial at a court-martial. Yet he was acquitted and even made an admiral later.
10 His disobedience yielded huge personal prestige, as can be seen from the fact that Wessel is praised in the national anthems of both Denmark and Norway (the country he originated from).
Model
Before formally defining our model, let us first recall the definition of a classical Assignment Problem (AP). An AP is defined by a triple (A, T, v), where A is a set of agents, T is a set of tasks, and v : A × T → R + ∪ {0} is the value function such that v(i, j) = v ij denotes the value generated when agent i performs task j. The problem is to find an assignment (or, matching) of agents to tasks for which the sum of the values of pairs matched is maximised.
Let binary variables x ij indicate whether agent i ∈ A is assigned to task j ∈ T . Given this, the assignment problem is modelled as follows:
Constraint (2) requires each agent to be assigned at most one task and constraint (3) requires each task to be allocated to at most one agent. Constraint (4) ensures that x ij are binary. 7 Situations resembling SAAPs can be found not only within military organisations. The 2011 war in Libya was fought by a coalition of NATO and loosely organised rebel troops who jointly tried to overthrow the regime of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. While the NATO forces were totally coordinated, it was arguably difficult to coordinate the actions of the rebels, who were untrained, unprofessional, and lacked command chains. Consequently, the NATO, as the central planner of the SAAP, had to anticipate the prospective actions of the rebels when making its decisions on air strikes. Information about the rebels' next steps was provided by so called liaison officers (NATO representatives assigned to the rebel units). 8 For an account of his deeds, see Chapter 1 ("A Knight Errant of the Seas") in [21] .
9 "He could not go back and ask for permission, and one may shrewdly guess that he did not want to, for it would certainly have been refused." ([21] , p. 10).
We now generalise the AP model to what we call the Semi-Autonomous Assignment Problem (SAAP). An SAAP is defined by a tuple
where C and F are two disjoint sets, and we set A := C ∪ F . As before, we refer to the elements of A as agents (or, players). In addition to coordinated (or, controlled ) agents C, who follow directions of the central planner, the set A includes free (or, autonomous) agents F , whose behaviour is not under the direct control of the central planner, but is governed by a preference profile F . The central planner can affect the behaviour of the free agents only through the tasks that he assigns to the coordinated agents. Formally, SAAP is max
s.t. (2), (3), (4) where g(x) is the value of the allocation of free agents to the tasks not assigned to controlled agents by x. In more detail, the behaviour of a free agent f ∈ F is specified by a linear preference order 11 f defined over a set T f ⊆ T . 12 The tasks in T f are interpreted to be those which can be accomplished by f .
The free agents assign themselves to available tasks by following the search process: after the coordinated agents were assigned to tasks by the central planner, each free agent f approaches the task j := max f T f . 13 If f finds j to be vacant, f takes over j. If f finds that a coordinated player already occupies j, f proceeds to the task which is second according to the preferences f , namely j := max f T f \ {j}. Again, f checks the availability of j and either takes it or continues with the subsequent item in its priority list. If there are no tasks left on f 's priority list which were not yet approached, f stays idle.
For two free players f and f it may be the case that T f ∩ T f = ∅. So what happens if f and f approach the same task j? In this case, we assume that the agent better at performing the task, i.e. the agent arg max i∈{f ,f } v ij keeps to j, while the other free agent continues the search process. This is a realistic assumption for scenarios in which free players, though being uncoordinated, have an interest in a high-valued solution of the problem (like in the disaster response application outlined in Section 2). However, our optimality result could be adjusted if another tie-breaking rule would be used instead. We call this procedure the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Blocked Tasks (DAB) as it coincides with Deferred Acceptance Algorithm of [8] as we describe next. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm of [8] constructs a stable matching that is most preferred by the proposing side in a marriage market. A marriage market is defined as a triple (M, W, ), where M is the set of "men" and W is the set of "women". A preference profile maps each m ∈ M into a linear preference order defined over W ∪ {m}, and each w ∈ W into a linear preference order defined over M ∪ {w} (the item x in x's preference order stands for the option of being single).
14 In terms of SAAP, let the tasks stand for the women and the free agents stand for the men. Then, the DAB search 11 A linear ordering is total, transitive, and antisymmetric. Antisymmetry ensures that a free agent is not indifferent between different tasks. 12 The strict relation f is derived from f in the standad way, i.e. t f t ⇔ ¬(t f t). 13 By antisymmetry of f , the element max f T f is unique.
process coincides with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm of [8] , executed in a restricted marriage market which does not include the controlled agents and the tasks they occupy. In this market, the preferences of the free agents are given by their preferences over subsets of tasks. All tasks which are not in the set T f are considered unacceptable for f (equivalently, less preferred than being single). The preferences of tasks over agents are given by the value function v: a task j prefers f over f iff v f j > v f j . We rule out ties in the task's preferences by assuming that for each task j we have v f j = v f j for any two different free agents f and f . Such "strict" preferences are a standard assumption in matching theory.
The DAB procedure converges to a stable matching. A stable matching is an assignment y that satisfies a "stability property", which can be concisely encoded by the blocking pair constraints (see, e.g., [24] ).
where y ij is a binary variable to indicate whether task j is assigned to agent i.
In DAB, free agents represent the proposing side, and the procedure converges to a stable matching that is optimal for the free agents: each agent prefers the optimal matching over any other stable matching. It is a well-known result in matching theory that the optimal stable matching for the proposing side coincides with the worst stable matching of the responding side. 15 Hence the matching selected by the free agents is the worst stable matching for the tasks. Specifically, if F j denotes the set of free agents that perform task j in some stable matching, then, in the agentoptimal matching, task j is performed by the least-qualified among these agents-arg min i∈F j v ij . As this holds for each task j, the value of the agent-optimal matching is the lowest among all stable matchings. Formally, the value of the agent-optimal matching is given by:
Equations (7) and (8) correspond to the assignment constraints (2) and (3), with the caveat that tasks assigned to a controlled agent are not available for assignment (see right-hand side of (8)). It is interesting to note that the integrality constraint (10) can be relaxed as has been shown by Vande Vate [29, Theorem 16] , allowing to replace it with a nonnegativity constraint. Now that we defined the behaviour of free agents, the SAAP can be fully specified as the following bilevel mixed integer linear program:
v ij y ij 15 See, for example, [13] , p. 13, or [23] , Theorem 2.13 and Corollary 2.14, p. 33.
4. Solution The optimisation problem faced by the central planner has two stages: in the first, he assigns controlled agents, and in the second, free agents assign themselves to remaining tasks. Formally, we have a mixed integer bilevel optimisation problem-a hierarchical program in which the set of constraints contains a parametric optimisation problem. Solving bilevel programs is difficult in general, let alone solving one with binary variables, and applying known algorithms to the program at hand would yield solutions only for extremely small problem instances. The most popular method for solving bilevel programs is to replace the second level with a set of KKT optimality conditions and then add these constraints to the first level to form a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) [16] . However, this introduces a set of complementary constraints that are difficult to deal with. 16 In fact, solving a linear bilevel program in which all functions are linear is already strongly NP-hard [17] . 17 In our case, the upper level contains binary variables and hence the problem is even more difficult. Instead, we will show that the SAAP problem is equivalent to a disjoint bilinear program, which is much more manageable computationally 18 , as stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The SAAP bilevel mixed integer linear programming model (SAAP(2LMILP)) is equivalent to the following disjoint bilinear program:
The complementary constraints can then be transformed into a new set of constraints that involve integer variables using a Big-M method. Alternatively, nonlinear programming relaxation can be used to approximate these complementary constraints.
17 Even checking local optimality in linear bilevel programming is NP-hard [17] . 18 Although solving bilinear programs is still NP-hard [2] , the mathematical programming formulation is in a much nicer form, i.e. we only have to deal with a single minimisation problem instead of a minimax problem. Notice that not all linear bilevel programs can be transformed into a bilinear problem. However, a disjoint bilinear program can be transformed into a linear bilevel program.
Proof:
At a high level, the transformation of an SAAP into a bilinear program involves three steps. First, we replace the linear program on the second level with its dual. Since the primal was a minimisation problem, the dual is a maximisation problem. Having maximisation in both first and second stages lets us combine the objectives and reduce the problem to a single-stage optimisation. The resulting problem belongs to the class of mixed integer non-convex quadratic programming problems and is still quite difficult to solve. We then exploit the special structure of the problem to note that the integrality constraints on x can be dropped obtaining a bilinear program. The details follow.
Let λ i , β j and γ ij be dual variables for constraints (7)- (9) for all (i, j) ∈ (F × T ). The dual problem is formulated as:
Plugging the dual into the original problem and combining two max operators, we obtain the following problem:
The objective function contains linear terms on (x, λ, β, γ) and a bilinear term −( (i,j)∈(C×T ) β j x ij ). Without this bilinear term, the problem will be equivalent to two separate optimisation problems: an assignment problem and a (dual of a) stable matching problem. Due to the presence of the bilinear terms together with the integrality constraint on x ij , this problem belongs to the class of mixed integer non-convex quadratic programming problems and is quite difficult to solve. However, it is interesting to notice that once we fix (λ, β, γ), the objective function is linear on x. The problem becomes:
This is an assignment problem, 19 and hence the integrality constraint can be relaxed (see for example Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [4, Corollary 7.2] ). Thus, for every solution λ, β, γ (or equivalently, for every y) to the agent-optimal stable matching problem, there is an integer solution x that is optimal. In other words, there is always an integer solution x that is optimal, and we can drop the integrality constraints in SAAP. This leads to the disjoint bilevel program SAAP(DBL).
There is an extensive literature on bilinear programming. A simple greedy approach called 'hill climbing algorithm' can be used to provide reasonable solution in short time [25] . This is done by iteratively solving an LP for optimal (λ, β, γ) for each fixed x and then solving another LP for an optimal x by fixing the newly found (λ, β, γ). This process is repeated until the optimal value does not improve. At which point we obtain a local optimal solution. It is noted also that the disjoint constraint sets in the SAAP problem are quite nice. The constraints on x define an assignment polyhedron with known extreme points and the constraints on (λ, β, γ) correspond to a dual feasible space of the stable matching problem. This means the LP problems can be solved very efficiently and the algorithm converge very fast to a local optimal solution. White [30] converts a bilinear program into a big LP whose constraints are generated sequentially through solving smaller LPs. This methods promises finite convergence and can be used to solve SAAP(DBL) as the assignment problem and the stable matching problem can be solved very efficiently. The bilinear program can also be reduced to a concave minimisation problem where an outter approximation algorithm can be applied [28] . More recent advanced methods for solving disjoint bilinear programming can be found in Alarie et al. [1] who apply cutting plane methods to produce global optimal solutions. Alarie et al. [1] shows that cutting plane methods can be used to solve disjoint bilinear programming problems with up to 500 variables in each disjoint set and with 100 constraints.
Conclusions
Our work introduces optimisation problems in which autonomous agents are placed together with those fully controlled by a central planner. The autonomous agents act to obtain their own individual goals. The central planner coordinates the controlled agents with the aim to optimise the overall performance of the system, while taking into account the behaviour of the self-motivated participants. This scenario is typical in realistic economic systems, some of which were outlined in Section 2. Specifically, we considered the Semi-Autonomous Assignment Problem (SAAP) in which the controlled agents are assigned by the central planner, while the free agents search for vacant tasks according to their own preference orders over subsets of accessible tasks.
Clearly, the search process assumed for the free agents is not the only reasonable way to put things. Indeed, there are many other possibilities for how one could model the behaviour of the free agents. For example, many real-world scenarios could be better described with a stochastic search process. One might also consider search strategies taken from cognitive psychology, like the famous satisficing heuristic of [26] or the take-the-best heuristic of [9] . It may be a worthwhile effort to perform a similar analysis like the one presented in this paper, but with alternative behavioural assumptions for the free agents. Models which combine rational and boundedly rational agents are very rare in the game theoretic literature, 20 yet in reality an increasing number of situations of this kind can be found. For example, in stock exchange markets, humans trade simultaneously with computer programs. The computers act extremely fast, without any psychological biases, and they have superior computing power-hence they could be considered to be fully rational players.
Despite of its various reasonable alternatives, we want to stress that the search process modelled in this article has some intriguing features. Firstly, it is quite natural to assume that the free agents check for free tasks in order of their preferences. Secondly, the order in which free players propose to tasks, and the order in which they are rejected, does not influence the outcome assignment as the DAB procedure leads to a unique outcome. This was shown by [19] , who modified the original algorithm of [8] so as to let men propose to women sequentially and in an arbitrary order (in [8] , the men propose simultaneously at each stage). They proved that the matching resulting from their algorithm is identical to the one generated by the standard deferred acceptance algorithm. Remarkably, this finding of [19] also implies that the outcome of the DAB algorithm is not affected by our assumption that the central planner assigns the coordinated agents first; in the DAB search process, the output matching would be the same even if the CP would assign the controlled agents when the free agents were already searching in the market. This is true as long as the coordinated agents could take away any task already occupied by a free agent, an assumption we think is not too unrealistic for those applications we described in Section 2. Thirdly, in the deferred acceptance algorithm of [8] there is no incentive for the proposing side, in our case the free agents, to misrepresent their preferences (cf. [7] , [22] ). In our context, this means that the free agents cannot improve their outcome by changing the order in which they approach tasks. So even if free agents would have enough information and computing power to act strategically, it would not be worthwhile to do this. In contrast, alternative models of search behaviour would have to take care of strategic manipulations on the free agents' parts. Of course, this makes handling our model merely convenient, yet does not say anything about the validity of its assumptions.
Other modifications to our model come to mind. It may be interesting to change the informational assumptions of the model. What if the productivities of the autonomous workers for different tasks is private knowledge of that worker? 21 Would there be a way to make the free agents reveal their private information? Could they even be incentivised to pick the task which would be best from the central planner's point of view? Designing a transfer scheme to achieve such goals would demand the free agents to be modelled with cardinal preferences. This would reduce the robustness of the model but it might add economically interesting dynamics similar to those which can be found in the famous labour market adjustment models of [6] and [12] .
The idea of introducing autonomous agents in scenarios where the central planner normally has full control is by no means limited to the allocation domain considered here. In fact, many other standard problems can be extended to include autonomous agents. Transportation or network flow with some transfers performed by autonomous agents, knapsack where autonomous agents are able to add their own items to the knapsack, and graph colouring with some nodes coloured by the agents are just a few examples.
